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This article considers national censuses in the US, France, and Russia based on new 
principles and held after their respective revolutions. The authors aim to find out to 
what extent the authorities succeeded in following enumeration procedures based 
on international regulations. It is demonstrated that a census is a dialectical pro-
cess involving the state and the population, requiring reciprocal trust. France had 
no experience of organising censuses with the exception of those in the country’s 
American colonies. The gentry wanted to keep control over their lands and would 
not share information about their population with the central authorities. In post-
revolutionary France, the census held during the Jacobin terror was not entirely suc-
cessful, with the state bureaucracy not being strong enough to organise a coherent 
census and different revolutionary committees taking uncoordinated measures to 
register the population. The US, however, had had a number of censuses organised 
by the British prior to the War of Independence. The first census in the United States 
was held in 1790 in compliance with the Constitution. As a result, the US has held 
censuses at decadal intervals ever since, but it faced a number of problems for a con-
siderable amount of time, especially concerning the registering of racial minorities. 
Russia was at an advantage in that respect since it held the first all-Russian census in 
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1897 in addition to local censuses and census-like tax revisions. The first all-Soviet 
census organised after the Revolution and Civil War in 1926 was successful, espe-
cially among the ethnic minorities in the polar parts of the country. However, the 
1937 census became part of repression measures, with detrimental consequences 
for the census and census takers alike. The US and Soviet censuses census organised 
after their respective revolutions were successful: in the former, the census created 
enthusiasm because it was regarded as an instrument to make the new democracy 
work, while in the Soviet Union of the 1920s, the census was perceived as a prereq-
uisite for the social and economic modernisation of the new state.
Keywords: Revolutions; population censuses; Russian Revolution; 1790 census 
of the US; French censuses; 1926 census of the Soviet Union.
Рассмотрены всеобщие национальные переписи населения в США, Франции 
и России, проведенные после окончания революций, повлекших кардиналь-
ные изменения в обществе, и организованные по новым принципам. Авто-
ры исследуют вопрос о том, в какой степени каждой из них удалось провести 
регистрацию населения в  соответствии с  новыми международными прави-
лами. Показано, что перепись населения – диалектический процесс, требую-
щий доверия и взаимодействия между властями и населением. Во Франции 
не было опыта организации переписей, за исключением тех, что были осу-
ществлены в их американских колониях. Дворяне стремились сохранить пол-
ный контроль в своих землях и не желали делиться информацией о населении 
с  центральной властью. Не вполне удалась послереволюционная перепись 
населения во Франции, проведенная в условиях террора якобинцев. Государ-
ственная бюрократия была слишком слаба, и многочисленные революцион-
ные комитеты проводили нескоординированные действия по регистрации 
населения. В США к началу Войны за независимость прошло несколько пере-
писей, организованных британцами. Первая перепись здесь была проведена 
в 1790 г., через несколько лет после окончания войны, в соответствии с ре-
шением, записанным в Конституции. С тех пор переписи населения в стране 
проходят регулярно с десятилетним интервалом, однако проблемы качества 
их проведения сохранялись достаточно долго, особенно в части регистрации 
расовых меньшинств. Россия имела явное преимущество, обладая опытом 
проведения Первой общероссийской переписи 1897 г., а  до нее  – организа-
ции городских переписей и ревизий населения. Первая перепись населения 
в Советском Союзе, проведенная после окончания революции и Гражданской 
войны в 1926 г., была вполне успешной, особенно Приполярная перепись эт-
нических меньшинств в северных районах страны. Однако следующая за ней 
Всесоюзная перепись 1937 г. стала частью репрессивной политики, повлекшей 
пагубные последствия как для ее результатов, так и для переписчиков. После-
революционные переписи населения в США и Советском Союзе были вполне 
успешными. В США ее приняли с большим энтузиазмом как необходимый 
инструмент утверждавшейся демократии, а в Советском Союзе – как предпо-
сылку социально-экономической модернизации нового государства.
Ключевые слова: революции; переписи населения; Русская революция; пе-
репись населения США 1790 г.; переписи населения во Франции; Всесоюз-
ная перепись населения 1926 г.
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Most historians will agree that the most significant revolutions in the 
Western Hemisphere have been the American, the French, and the Russian. 
Among their far-reaching consequences was the introduction of popula-
tion censuses taken with new procedures that aimed to provide more ac-
curate population statistics. The US from 1790, France from the 1790s, and 
Russia from 1920 used different methods, however, and the scope and ac-
curacy of the enumerations in each of the three nations differed as well. The 
very definition of a census demands that the whole territory should be in-
cluded and that the population should be counted on a specific census day 
in order to avoid under-enumeration and the repeated listing of migrants 
[Goyer, Draaijer]. This article highlights the factors that decided the extent 
to which enumerators in the US, France, and Russia were able to live up to 
such strict demands. 
The demands were the strictest in the Soviet Union, not only because 
by the 20th century the contents of a population census were much more 
complex and the questionnaires and instructions more advanced than in 
the late 18th century. The Soviet census had to serve as a basic instrument 
for the planned economy, not only enumerating the population, but also 
mapping in as great detail as possible the resources available for build-
ing a centralized socialist economy. Since the US census was primarily an 
instrument for deciding suffrage and distributing delegates to Congress, 
it could simply count adult men – women got the full right to vote in 1920. 
In France, the census got off to a difficult start when different revolutionary 
committees were unable to coordinate their enumeration efforts.
Sociologists recently presented a theory about population censuses as 
dialectical interplay between the state and the population in order to ex-
plain the variation in the scope, contents, and methodology of censuses 
[Emigh, Riley and Ahmed, 2015a; Emigh, Riley and Ahmed, 2015b]. The 
theory’s pivotal point is that the power of the central state relative to re-
gional leaders and pressure groups decides to what degree statisticians as 
agents of the state were able to carry out any national enumeration. In none 
of the three post-revolutionary states was it obvious that censuses could 
be taken reasonably quickly. The US managed to create a simple, numeric 
census in 1790, seven years after the end of the Revolutionary War and only 
three years after the Constitutional Assembly ratified census taking. After 
a similar length of time, the Bolsheviks had to acknowledge that war made 
their 1920 census premature and that it would only cover parts of the Soviet 
Union. Several revolutionary committees organized censuses in France, but 
none came to cover the whole nation, and most of the census manuscripts 
ended up as heating material. 
Of the three revolutionary states, the French had the least experience with 
census taking. In the 18th century, several theoretical attempts were made to 
assess the number of inhabitants based on vital rates and experimental multi-
plication factors. The exception was the censuses arranged in French Canada 
in the 17th century. Regional opposition against providing Paris with cen-
sus numbers blocked all attempts by state representatives to arrange national 
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enumerations. However, “suddenly in 1789 the word ‘impossible’ stopped 
being French for census taking” [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., p. 292]. The 
US, in contrast, had extensive experience, since the British arranged enu-
merations in most of its American colonies before the War of Independence, 
despite the House of Lords blocking similar counting in Britain itself. 
Russian administrators had experience not only from the 1897 census, 
which covered the whole empire except Finland, but also from censuses 
run in many of its cities in the 1870s and 1880s and the Revizkie Skazkie 
(census-like tax revisions), of which the tenth and last was organized in 
1858. The 1905 Russian Revolution, World War I, the 1917 revolutions, civil 
war, and foreign intervention led to the postponement of the second all-
Russian census. 
The Independent United States and their censuses
As principal members of the Constitutional Assembly, Congress leader 
James Madison and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson were well aware of 
the importance of census taking for the political functioning of their new 
American republic. On 14 February 1790, the former wrote to the latter: 
“A Bill for taking a census has passed the House of Representatives, and is 
with the Senate” [Madison]. Madison phrased the need for a headcount in 
this manner: “Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first 
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent 
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct” [Consti-
tution of the US, 1787, article 1, section 2]. Congress passed its first bill 
about census taking in 1790 and has continued the practice every decade 
since. The scope and contents of the US census has varied, but some form 
of enumeration is mandatory according to the Constitution. Already from 
the start, some politicians wanted to drop re-enumeration in order to cut 
expenses or because they were satisfied with the existing calculation of vot-
ers and delegates. But this would be unconstitutional. 
Jefferson continued monitoring the census procedures and results, and in 
August 1791 noted that nearly all states had returned them. He distinguished 
between empirical and estimated results for the many places still missing in-
formation: “the result, which as far as founded on actual returns is written in 
black ink, and the numbers not actually returned, yet pretty well known, are 
written in red ink. Making a very small allowance for omissions, we are up-
wards of four millions; and we know in fact that the omissions have been very 
great” [Jefferson]. This is but one example of how learned men used census 
results in their letters and publications, for instance in state histories – there 
was not even a temporary census office to compute aggregates. However, 
these statistics included only people who lived inside the initially recognized 
thirteen states, since other territories elected no representatives to national 
offices yet. This was to change rapidly: before the next census in 1800, Ver-
mont, Kentucky, and Tennessee were accepted into the Union and arranged 
census taking at the turn of the new century. 
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The US Congress distributes representatives among the states based on 
census figures describing the electorate. In March 1792, they passed a bill 
with a distribution that many southerners felt favoured the northern states. 
President Washington discussed the matter with his government, where 
Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton disagreed as 
usual. Jefferson suggested a more southern-friendly method of distribut-
ing delegates. Washington vetoed the bill, the first presidential veto ever. 
Congress had to adopt an apportionment system along Jefferson’s guide-
lines [Anderson, p. 16]. With all the checks and balances of Jeffersonian 
democracy, there is always a danger that the census-based US representa-
tive democracy might be politically impotent. By mid-1792, however, cen-
tral observers could note with satisfaction that the world’s first democracy 
based on census taking actually functioned, despite under-enumerations 
and other shortcomings. In addition to the British pre-revolutionary cen-
suses, it helped that during the Revolution individual colonies had created 
census-like tax lists in 1776 or lists to check which citizens failed to sign the 
1778 Oath of Fidelity [Federal Census Schedule]. The government’s attempt 
from 1798 to levy a tax on slaves, housing, and land failed, and made little 
impact on census methodology [Anderson, p. 17]. With British all-union 
taxation as the main controversial issue before the War of Independence, 
it should not surprise us that the collection of federal taxes was problematic. 
President Jefferson and others campaigned to include more details in 
the 1800 census. Even if built on the earlier model, the 1800 census in-
troduced smaller administrative divisions and age distributions for whites, 
while only gross aggregates represented the Indian and slave populations. 
Congress ignored Jefferson’s pleas for occupational and economic data col-
lection, likely because it could be used for taxation. It gave the marshals 
nine months during which to assemble, verify, and aggregate the census 
returns, an interval Congress tried unsuccessfully to shorten in 1810. From 
each of these censuses, Congress published one volume of statistics report-
ing that the population had grown to 7.2 million inhabitants in 1810. They 
could proudly ascertain that US population numbers grew faster than the 
English, inspiring hopes that they would eventually overtake their former 
rulers. One reason for the growth was that the revolution in the US was 
a “Revolutionary War”, which ended with a peaceful period from 1783. 
This revolution is also known as the American War of Independence dur-
ing which they got rid of the British colonizers with French help: from the 
standpoint of the census, this seems a more relevant concept. By census-
time in 1790, the US authorities had full control over the territory, and 
most war damage had been repaired. It initiated a long period of regular 
census taking: the US is the only country in the world which has taken 
censuses at regular, decadal intervals since 1790, although with severe 
under-enumeration problems. This was very different from France, where 
the attack on the Bastille on 14 July 1789 started more than two decades 
of unrest and wars. 
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The Great French Revolution and population census
The revolutionaries needed a census for traditional reasons like taxation 
and military conscription, but they also had political motives, specifically 
the identification of suspected counter-revolutionaries and monitoring the 
progress of the revolution. In a few years, the records should make obvi-
ous to everyone “the advantages of a free government and the good that 
we have done” [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., p. 292]. There was no lack of 
political will in this respect. Revolutionary committees passed no less than 
four decrees about census taking from 1789 to the summer of 1791. They 
repealed orders sent to the municipalities in December 1789 in the follow-
ing January because the enumerations could not be completed in time for 
the elections. The decree was reinstated in late June 1790, when two other 
revolutionary committees ordered enumerations, one by district, canton, 
and municipality, the other a listing of tax classes by commune and the 
number of hearths. Orders were given by le Comité de Division, le Comité 
de Constitution, le Comité de Mendicité (begging), and le Comité de Con-
tribution: later, the Ministries of Finances, the Interior, and Public Instruc-
tion also did this. 
The office for vital statistics established in 1786 would normally have 
carried out the central compilation of census aggregates, but this agency 
was too weak to act during the turmoil of the revolution, and the revolu-
tionaries did not prioritize the establishment of a real, central statistical 
bureau. Thus, the strong will of Jacobin politicians was moderated by the 
state’s lack of administrative leverage. Therefore, the masses of data sent to 
Paris from the localities could not be turned into statistical information, 
even if some aggregates were produced on the local and regional levels and 
published from 1792 to 1794 [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., p. 292]. The 
piles of paper were stored conscientiously for a while, and some of it has 
survived in the archives. Much of it ended up heating stoves or as card-
board, however.
The need for administrative coordination became obvious during the 
rule of the Directory from November 1795 to November 1799. Still, it was 
not until August 1798 that Minister Francois Neufchâteau (1750–1828) or-
ganized the “Bureau du Nord” in his Department of the Interior: this was 
charged with all census taking upon the establishment of the rule of the 
Consulate in 1799. Jean-Antoine Chaptal (1756–1832) became Minister 
of the Interior in the autumn of 1800. Chaptal, who is more famous for 
introducing the metric system, followed up the preparations for a general 
population count, which had been ordered in a circular of 16 May 1800. 
The Department required the mayors in all French municipalities to es-
tablish an enumeration of the population divided by married men, wid-
owers, married women, widows, boys, girls, and the military. Otherwise, 
the instructions sent out were scanty in the extreme: supposedly, de jure, 
numeric census enumeration should be applied. Many mayors contented 
themselves with submitting rough numbers, which generally underesti-
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mated the population. Others were more accurate, basing their aggregates 
either on nominative census lists or population registers existing in some 
localities. Chaptal and his staff had serious doubts about the correctness 
of the 1801 census, thus organizing a special enumeration in 1802. There-
fore, it may be reasonable to question whether it is fair to call the enumera-
tion in 1801 the first real census in France [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., 
p. 292]. As late as 1975, French demographers published a reconstruction 
of five-year French population totals for the period 1740 to 1860 based on 
mortality statistics. The authors are probably right that emigration and im-
migration were limited during this period, since their estimates correspond 
well with the censuses from 1806 onwards. The 1801 census, however, 
is deemed to have underestimated the population of France by 0.9 million 
people, or three percent [Henry, Blayo]. Le Bureau de Statistique published 
a summary of the statistical results in 1806.
In addition to the general weaknesses of the administrative apparatus af-
ter the Revolution, disagreement among leading French ‘statisticians’ helps 
explain the somewhat chaotic census taking. Only a couple of weeks after 
Chaptal became Minister of the Interior in November 1800, he appointed 
Alexandre de Ferrière as head of the newly reorganized “bureau de statis-
tique”. De Ferrière interspersed his administrative duties with the writing 
of comedies. He adhered to the German school of descriptive rather than 
quantitative statistics, typically writing: “We must not fool ourselves, rigor-
ous precision and mathematical exactitude are impossible” [Desrosières, 
p. 47]. De Ferrière found it more important to edit, publish, and comment 
upon the memoires of administrative prefects in l’Analise de la statistique 
generale than to administer and publish aggregates from the 1801 census 
returns. This heyday of non-quantitative statistics ended after Jean-Baptiste 
de Nompère de Champagny (1756–1834) became Minister of the Interior 
in 1804 and stopped the publication of memoires. This moderate politi-
cian, experienced administrator, and ambassador wanted practical results 
from his statistical bureau, most notably municipal overviews of the popu-
lation by domicile based on nominative lists [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., 
p. 292]. However, no results from the new census which the statistical bu-
reau attempted to undertake in 1804 have ever been published. 
Now the time was ripe for the actuary and mathematician Emmanuel 
du Villard de Durand (1755–1832) to repeat his harsh criticism of the 
statistical bureau’s publications, including its elementary errors in calcu-
lation. De Ferrière‘s attempt to reply with a jest was in vain: “A more ex-
act estimate of the weight of vegetable production in France will not add 
a single piece of cabbage to the gardens”. Du Villard made no secret of his 
ambitions to replace the director of the Bureau where he was already em-
ployed. Champagny appointed him as vice director three days after he re-
ceived the critical letter. De Ferriére soon stepped down, and du Villard 
formulated a program for the calculation of precise quantitative statistics, 
wanting the Bureau’s employees to become scientists rather than archivists 
[Desrosières, p. 48]. They should discuss and verify critically the figures 
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received from other authorities, and analyse the relationship between the 
various aggregates about the population. Du Villard went on to give advice 
about the next census, due in 1806. This was still the responsibility of the 
Bureau du Nord, and intradepartmental intrigues may explain why du Vil-
lard remained second in command by the appointment of Charles Ètienne 
Coquebert de Montbret (1751–1831) as director of a once more reorgan-
ized “Bureau d’administration génerale de la statistique”. He came from a 
position as customs director on the Rhine and was an experienced mining 
engineer. The Bureau du Nord administered their second census, which 
was due five years after the rather unsuccessful 1801 census. The 1806 cen-
sus is without doubt the most accurate from the revolutionary and Napo-
leonic period, counting the legal (de jure) rather than the de facto (present) 
population [Dupaquier J., Dupaquier M., p. 292]. 
The 1917 Revolution and population censuses
After a successful start in population registration during the all-Russian 
census in 1897, there was a break due to the first Russian Revolution in 
1905, followed by yearlong mutinies that made the next census impossible. 
The economic hardships and food crises after Russia entered World War I 
required urgent information about population and supplies, and desper-
ate attempts were made by several Russian municipalities to register its 
population in order to arrange efficient food supply. There were the all-
Russian agricultural census of 1916 and all-Russian urban census of 1917 
[Гапоненко, Кабузан]. On census day in Ekaterinburg (15 January 1917), 
the city authorities addressed the citizens in the local newspaper in order 
to explain the main purpose of the enumeration: the census was designed 
to solve the food crises, so they needed to know the size of the population. 
They also planned to monitor the need for fuel, the number of disabled 
citizens, persons with education and professional skills, etc. The authorities 
warned about gossip that the confiscation of food would follow the census, 
and called on people to trust and help the census takers. 
It is not surprising that the revolutionary Bolsheviks attempted to take a 
census as soon as 1920: it included questions about agricultural production, 
so it was important for the planned economy. In his publications, Lenin had 
used aggregates from the 1897 census to group the towns in the European 
part of Russia, and he helped the census effort in 1920 by allocating ra-
tioned paper for printing census questionnaires. Lenin’s quest for precise 
information was something the authorities would point to repeatedly in or-
der to motivate people to participate in the censuses. Allegedly, on Lenin’s 
orders, the question about religion from 1897 was replaced by questions 
about nationality (natcional’nost’). The 1920 census effort failed, however, 
due to lack of resources: in any case, it could never have covered the whole 
territory due to foreign interventions and the civil war, which was still rag-
ing. About 28 percent of the total population was excluded due to severe 
under-enumeration in provinces like Belorussia, the Crimea, the Volga, 
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Transcaucasia, Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara, the Far East, and regional parts 
of Ukraine and Siberia. Thus, the published aggregates cover only parts of 
the USSR. In 1923, an urban census along the same lines was conducted in 
towns and other densely populated places [Schwartz].
In charge of the difficult task of collecting statistical information during 
the turbulent decade from 1917 to 1926 was Pavel Il’itch Popov, born in 
Irkutsk in 1872. He graduated from the teachers’ high school (siminaria) 
and worked two years as a teacher in Ust’-Ude before going west to study in 
St Petersburg, where he was arrested in 1896 for links to the Social Demo-
cratic Party. After a year in prison, he was exiled to Ufa gubernia, working 
as a statistician there and in a number of other Russian cities. He stud-
ied agronomy in Berlin for a couple of years: when he returned after the 
Revolution in 1905, he became a statistician with the city administration 
in St Petersburg while working in parallel on the agricultural statistics of 
Ukraine. He also obtained detailed knowledge of the Russian Empire by 
being employed at statistical offices as assistant and, later, as head of sta-
tistics in several cities (Samara, Smolensk, Vologda, Khar’kov, and Tula) 
from 1900. Due to his solid scholarly background, the national congress of 
statisticians in 1915 elected Popov as secretary general before he took part 
in the all-Russian agricultural census of 1916. The provisional government 
appointed him director of the Statistical Bureau in March 1917.
It likely helped Popov’s career that he knew Lenin personally from 
meeting him first in Ufa, where the Bolshevik leader came to visit his wife 
when returning from Siberian exile, and later in Finland in 1905. In addi-
tion, other revolutionary acquaintances such as People’s Commissar and 
statistician Aleksandr Tsiouroupa most likely recommended his continued 
directorship of the reorganized Directorate of Statistics after the Bolshe-
viks took power. He defended the independence of statistical expertise in 
conflicts with other agencies and was not afraid of directly opposing politi-
cal pressure from such high-ranking politicians as Zinoviev, Bukharin and 
Stalin, or protesting when he found that they had misused statistical results. 
The result was his eviction from the post as director of Soviet statistics – 
the Bolsheviks obviously wanted the primacy of political over scholarly 
criteria when constructing statistical aggregates. This brought an end to 
his frequent travelling and participation in international statistical confer-
ences. Popov was degraded to the post of director of agriculture in Gosplan, 
a post he kept until 1948, two years before he died [Blum, Mespoulet, 18–19].
The census taken in 1926 was the most reliable of the early Soviet cen-
suses, and with the smallest amount of under-enumeration. The domi-
nance of the tsarist regime and the Orthodox Church had ended, so people 
dared to answer census questions about language or ethnicity. The Bolshe-
vik authorities were in charge of the entirety of the USSR’s territory: they 
were liberal with respect to the right of national groups to express their 
own culture and the collectivization of agriculture had not started. There-
fore, there is reason to put faith in the information about “nationality” which 
the 1926 census asked for in addition to mother tongue. The narodnost’ 
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concept can today be translated as ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnicity’, depending on 
what part of the USSR and which ethnic groups we consider. For instance, 
Russians or Uzbeks were major ethnic groups, forming the majority popula-
tion of two republics: they could alternatively be classified as nationalities 
(national’nost’). Other groups, such as the Lopari (contemporary Sami) or 
the Ostiaks (contemporary Khanty), were minorities inside republics with 
other majorities. In this case, we must rather translate narodnost’ as ethnicity. 
People had to answer this census question by self-identification, and cultural 
aspects rather than ancestry or biological background were what was sought. 
Since the census taker would usually interview the male head of household, 
the guideline to report maternal ethnicity for children in mixed marriage 
families was not easy to follow. Nationality in the sense of citizenship was not 
a relevant criterion – people were citizens of the Soviet Union.
The 1926 all-union census resulted in the publication of 55 volumes 
with printed statistical aggregates consisting of two main series organ-
ized by republic. In the first series, the focus was on the national or eth-
nic composition of the republics, provinces, and regions, which was in ac-
cordance with the efforts of the Bolshevik Party to organize the republics 
as semi-independent nations. The occupational structure of the country 
was equally important, since the authorities wanted to map the productive 
forces available for building the USSR as well as to identify social segments 
that could threaten the new worker state’s stability. In the Russian parts of 
the Union, nearly two thirds of the enumerators were statisticians, students, 
or teachers, while in the Central Asian parts just above one third belonged 
to these categories [Schwartz]. Many census takers were students educated 
in Moscow and other cities, but they often lacked detailed knowledge of 
local languages, customs, and topography.  In certain districts, for example 
in Ufa, they were unwelcome, and local leaders had to escort them. They 
were partly rewarded with school credits and partly forced to participate 
with gentle methods. Some were in a hurry, defining ethnicity by the origin 
of the family name or accepting the vernacular version of expressions like 
“God only knows” as an answer. Other census takers were worried that the 
answer “prostitute” from a group of women would be unacceptable. In the 
Far East, age had to be computed via the Chinese calendar, and some cen-
sus wards had to be re-registered since the narodnost’ or ethnicity “Sibiriak” 
was too general and unacceptable to the authorities [Hirsch, p. 96–99]. 
All the hardships of the early 20th century affected the population’s size 
and structure, as shown by the 1920 and, more completely, the 1926 cen-
suses. According to the 1897 census, the population of the Russian Empire 
stood at 125.6 million inhabitants, excepting the Grand Duchy of Finland. 
According to estimates based on vital registers, in 1911 the total population 
had increased to 167 million. If we include the areas not counted, the popu-
lation of Soviet Russia in 1920 has been estimated at about 137 million. By 
then, the following countries were not included: Poland with 18 million, 
Finland with 3 million, Romania with 3 million, and the Baltic states with 
5 million. Also, Karskaia oblast’, with about 400,000 former Russian citizens, 
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had been transferred to Turkey according to the peace treaty between So-
viet Russia and Turkey in 1921. Comparing the population pyramids based 
on the 1897 and 1926 censuses for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Un-
ion respectively, the changes in the composition of the population are strik-
ing (fig. 1, 2). In 1897, the ten-year age groups reveal a regularly decreasing 
Fig. 2. Population of the Soviet Union according to the 1926 census  
by age and sex (in thousands) [Mitchell]
Fig. 1. Population of European Russia according to the 1897 census  
by age and sex (in thousands) [Mitchell]
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population in the older age groups due to mortality, while the youngest age 
band is smaller simply because it was aggregated as a five-year age group. 
The aggregates from 1926 are all from five-year age groups, and it is evident 
that the number of children aged five to nine and ten to fourteen had been 
reduced due to the hardships of war and revolution.
As an extension of the all-union 1926 census, the authorities made 
a special effort to collect detailed information about the multi-ethnic 
northern territories of the Soviet Union in the Polar census (Pripolarnaia 
perepis’). ‘Northern’ in this context could mean quite far south: for instance, 
the Kamchatka peninsula extends nearly to fifty degrees latitude, but was 
included due to its interesting aboriginal populations. To all these remote 
areas, the census bureaucrats sent some of the best ethnologists and other 
scientists with what must be the most detailed census questionnaires ever 
used anywhere in the world.  In contrast to what happened to most other 
primary census manuscripts from the Soviet Union or Russia, in many 
cases the regional archives have preserved the original Polar census forms. 
Researchers have been able to copy them and transcribe the contents into 
database formats some eight decades after the census.
In order to understand what an achievement it is that this unique ma-
terial was collected and has survived, we shall look further into the case 
study of the Polar census taken in the Yamal Peninsular region. Four differ-
ent expeditions explored this vast territory to the east of the northern Ural 
mountain chain, where most of the population was nomadic. The arctic 
conditions in the wilderness required the expeditions to adapt to the no-
madic lifestyle of the populations they enumerated. The students Lebedev 
and Voznesenski, with the interpreter Zotov and under the leadership of 
Vladimirtcev, set out to cover the Yamal Peninsula on 28 November. A pack 
of wolves attacked them on the first day. Since they lost most of their sledge 
reindeer, they had to risk going to the Schuch’ya river trading post with a 
light sledge: they were not even carrying a tent. Wolf attacks also occurred 
during the Nadymo-Poluiskaya expedition south of the peninsula, alleged-
ly because they could not buy poison to kill them from the foreign traders 
whose visits along the coast the authorities now outlawed. The expedition’s 
leader, the Russian Ethnographical Museum scientist Raisa Mitusova, the 
ethnography student Natalia Kotovschikova, also from Leningrad, and the 
journalist Jurkevich from Sverdlovsk were joined by two interpreters who 
also functioned as pursers. Deep snow made their progress towards the 
distant settlements almost insuperable, and after a pneumonia incidence 
the leader could only register households at the closest trading posts. Such 
hardships among northern census takers had parallels in Canada, where 
a census taker who lost his way by Lake Manitoba allegedly only survived 
because he ate his horse [Hamilton, Inwood, p. 101]. 
The start of the expedition into the Tazovsk region was equally dif-
ficult due to health problems. One of the census takers, the exiled lawyer 
P.  Brzhesinsky, was severely wounded when his blitz photography equip-
ment exploded inadvertently. At that point, he and the other enumerator, 
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the local expert Vityazev (as well as the agronomist/statistician P. Jordanski), 
were already much delayed due to illness among the regional reindeer herds 
which transported them. The one with the fewest problems was the one-man 
expedition Grigorii Artejev, a local schoolteacher who knew the Zyryans and 
the Samoeds: he needed no interpreter and got their help with lodging, pro-
visions, and transportation. Thus, he was the exception from the centralistic 
approach of the Bolshevik regime when employing census takers.
The expedition members brought enough provisions for one month in 
the field, including bread, meat, cereals, butter, tea, sugar, dried fruit, spices, 
cranberries (to prevent scurvy), soap, and a first-aid kit. Leonid Shul’ts, who 
headed the census operations, reported the need for more medical equip-
ment to assist people in the remote settlements, since that made them more 
cooperative when answering the many census questions. It helped that the 
census takers could trade with the locals, exchanging staples for fresh food 
or buying fur clothes. To reduce under-enumeration, the organizers sent 
information about the census to the subjects on beforehand, and the ex-
peditions had to follow a pre-designed itinerary. The polar census takers 
reported that most people were willing to specify their demography, house-
hold composition, migration, production, and consumption. The reindeer 
owners with big herds, however, constantly concealed the real number of 
animals, so the enumerators tried to check themselves [Glavatskaya]. 
Not only did the Polar census attempt to cover a huge territory, but it 
also aimed to collect information about all aspects of life in the villages and 
other settlements in the numerous types of questionnaires provided. The 
most central form was the nominative household card with 405 fields, list-
ing all members of a household unit by name, age, family relationship, mar-
ital status, ethnicity, and income. A special card provided extra information 
about the head of the household, with last names, occupation, and address 
with name of the settlement and region. Production, consumption, and 
all equipment available in the household were detailed in the budget and 
economy cards. These detailed the different types of game and fish caught, 
including a simple time use study. On special trade cards, it was noted what 
the households sold and bought. In addition, the census takers reported 
more qualitative information about the settlements in their community 
diaries: they took pictures, drew many maps, and registered the types of 
commerce at trading posts [The 1926/27 Soviet polar census expeditions]. 
The general impression from the reports of the census takers in the Ob-
dorsk region is rather pessimistic, and we can read it like a premonition 
of the kind of economic-demographic problems that became fatal for the 
leading Soviet census takers in 1937. In 1926, they could still blame prob-
lems on the Civil War and foreign intervention, but the reorganization of 
the trading system from big markets to smaller trading posts called “fac-
tories” may also have caused problems. Especially severe was the lack of 
foreign hunting equipment, such as traps, bullets, and strychnine poison to 
kill game and wolves. Although trade with foreigners along the Arctic coast 
now being illegal, in these vast territories contraband commerce was diffi-
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cult to control. Because of the goods deficit, the wolf packs increased in size 
while the reindeer herds were diminished because people had to slaughter 
more animals in order to compensate for the lack of other foodstuffs. 
Despite certain deficiencies, there is no doubt that the 1926 all-union 
census, together with the Polar census, was the most successful post-rev-
olutionary enumeration ever performed. Unfortunately, the international 
isolation of the Soviet Union and rigid political centralization inside the 
country halted the revolutionary development of population studies. The 
events of the 1930s, especially the Moscow show trials, meant that the suc-
cess of the 1926 All-Union census could not be followed up. The 1937 cen-
sus manuscripts and aggregates were destroyed and the census directors 
were executed because the authorities found the results politically unac-
ceptable [Жиромская, Киселев, Поляков]. The replacement, in the form 
of the 1939 census, gave results which are disputed and cannot be checked 
due to the destruction of the original census manuscripts. After the war, the 
Soviet Union prioritized tasks other than census taking, and only in 1959 
was the next enumeration performed. Since then, the Soviet Union or Rus-
sia has taken a census in every decade. 
* * *
Post-revolutionary periods are always volatile, making it difficult to 
perform many tasks involving the state and the whole population, such as 
taking censuses properly. In order to evaluate the enumerations organized 
in spite of war, unrest, economic difficulties and a deficient bureaucracy, 
we need to ask: when is a census, a census? [Goyer, Draaijer]. First, na-
tional legal authority is required, together with complete coverage of a well-
defined enumeration area. This has been the case in the US since 1790. 
It was not possible in the Soviet Union in 1920, although the USSR reached 
these goals by 1926. In France, the terror and wars which started with the 
Revolution made coverage of the French nation with a census impossible 
before the turn of the century. Further census requirements are simulta-
neous and individual enumeration. In none of the cases was it possible 
to enumerate the whole population on the same census day. To what degree 
it was possible to mirror the situation on one specific day (thus including 
people who died and those who were born shortly after) is difficult to tell. 
Neither the first French nor the first US censuses were individual in the 
sense that they listed individuals in nominative census manuscripts; these 
censuses were numeric, as was usual until the mid-19th century. In addi-
tion to being nominative, the first Soviet censuses also met the requirement 
to publish statistical aggregates, while early US and French publications 
were scarce indeed. 
In order for a census to be successful, further requirements need to be 
fulfilled. A census is a dialectical process involving the state and the popu-
lation and requires reciprocal trust. If significant parts of the people are 
hostile to the enumeration and the census takers, it is difficult to get trust-
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worthy results. The terror of the French Revolution created a bad climate 
for cooperation between the state and major population groups from the 
very start. The 1790 US census and the 1926 Soviet census were successful 
because they were accepted as enumerations organized for the people and 
supported by the people. In the US, there was enthusiasm for census taking 
as an instrument to make their new democracy work in opposition to pre-
vious British rule; the main slogan during the Revolutionary War had been 
“no taxation without representation”. There was also mercantilist enthusi-
asm about increasing population numbers. Unlike similar post-revolution-
ary Soviet population claims in the 1930s, American calculations were built 
on enumerations rather than theoretical projections: thus, they were able 
to note that the US population overtook that of England and Wales by 1840 
[Anderson, p. 21]. In the Soviet Union, there was enthusiasm about the 
building of the new workers’ and farmers’ state in the 1920s, an enthusiasm 
which sadly faded during the repressions of the 1930s, when trust was re-
placed by an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. The complete failure of the 
1937 census also teaches a lesson to those who allege that censuses are con-
structions created by the state more or less independently [Curtis]. After 
Stalin and the party leaders realized that the results were incompatible with 
their preconceived ideas about population statistics, they saw no alternative 
but to destroy all census materials and execute or jail the census directors. 
Census taking suffered during the Moscow trials, just as it did during the 
Jacobin terror in France. 
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